One of our main criticisms of the Federal Reserve, as an institution entrusted with the conduct of monetary policy, was that it had not produced a firm foundation for its actions. Absence of a foundation was revealed by the neglect of research on either strategic or tactical issues and, also, by the often vague and imprecise statements of the connections between Federal Reserve actions and their effects. We noted that serious consideration had been given to these issues in the twenties by Riefler, Burgess and Strong, but in the forties and fifties, very little analysis of strategic or tactical issues appeared or was carried out. We found that Federal Reserve policy was pro-cyclical, on average, and concluded that pro-cyclicality resulted from the importance given to free reserves in Federal Reserve operations and in judgments about the direction or thrust of monetary policy. 2 The Federal Reserve was not immune to the criticisms. Research on monetary policy increased. Federal Reserve procedures and interpretations of policy changed; short-term interest rates and the demand for money replaced free reserves and the free reserve doctrine in the Board's discussions. The Board's staff developed a general equilibrium model of the economy. The model represents an effort by the staff to impose consistency in the relation of policy action to forecasts of the path of economic activity and prices, 3 In the seventies, recognition of the desirability of monetary control increased, and much greater attention was given, at least verbally, to monetary aggregates. The role assigned to interest rates became more ambiguous. Interest rates were referred to less often as the "target" of monetary policy and more often as the means of influencing monetary aggregates.
In October 6, 1979, a further evolution occurred. Greater emphasis was to be given to monetary aggregates. By controlling nonborrowed reservestotal reserves minus member-bank borrowing -the Federal Reserve claimed that it would improve control of the growth rates of the principal monetary aggregates. The new procedures continued or revived old themes, however. Required reserves were a fixed proportion of deposits two weeks earlier, under the Federal Reserve rule known as lagged reserve accounting, so banks' demand for reserves to meet requirements was satisfied by changes in borrowing and free reserves. The Federal Reserve revived major pieces of the free reserve doctrine (see Meltzer (1981) ). For example, Chairman Volcker (1980) again refers to increases in member-bank borrowing as evidence of monetary re-
2
We discussed some of these issues in terms of targets and indicators for monetary policy. The terms "targets" and "indicators" have acquired several meanings, so we limit usage of these terms in this discussion.
striction and uses arguments based on the free reserve doctrine to explain his reasoning. Similar statements are made by other spokesmen.
After a year of experience, the Federal Reserve conducted a study of the new procedures. Two volumes, containing papers assessing performance in the year following the October 1979 announcement, give evidence of the technical ability and professional standard of many staff members. The principal shortcomings of the volume are related to the general framework used for analysis and policy evaluation. The framework, a standard IS-LM model, augmented by a Phillips curve, reflects developments in economics during the fifties and sixties but largely ignores later developments. Notable examples are the central ideas emphasized in the method known as rational expectations and illustrated by the time inconsistency problem. Also, the volumes usually separate tactical procedures for short-term control of the monetary aggregates (or interest rates) from the influence of tactical decisions on the growth of various aggregates, the persistence of "errors," and the resulting pro-cyclicality of monetary growth.
This paper discusses several of the contributions in the two volumes. The following section gives a summary of the main findings in several of the principal papers. Next, we consider the work on tactics, particularly the paper by David Lindsey and others that evaluates the experience in the first year using revised procedures to control monetary aggregates. We find that the main conclusion of the Lindsey paper is based on an incorrect analysis. Strategic issues concern the control of inflation, methods of reducing the cost of disinflation, and the use of stable versus flexible rules for monetary policy. Several of these issues are raised in the papers by Richard Davis, Dana Johnson, and Jared Enzler, and in Stephen Axilrod's introduction. We comment on a number of these issues before considering an issue that receives scarcely any attention either in the two volumes or in other Federal Reserve studies in monetary economics -the case for, or against, the activist strategy. Our preliminary examination finds no evidence that Federal Reserve operations reduce the variability of output.
A SELECTIVE SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
The announcement on October 6, 1979 expressed a determination to improve control of money growth by giving greater attention to monetary aggregates. The announcement was followed immediately by a substantial increase in the level and variability of interest rates on a wide range of assets. In March 1980, controls were placed on borrowing and lending as part of a revised policy proposed to reduce inflation. The new policy was followed by a 9% decline in the level of output and a decline in interest rates for all maturities. Growth of narrowly defined money, (annual rate), fell from 7% in the first quarter to -3% in the second. Controls on borrowing and lending were removed in July. During the third quarter, money growth soared to 14.6%, and interest rates rose to new levels.
The staff of the Board of Governors, with some assistance from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, analyzed the causes and consequences of the variability of money and its relation to the change in procedures. The papers in the two volumes can be classified into three groups. One group addresses strategic issues. Included here are papers by Richard Davis, Jared Enzler, and by Enzler and Lewis Johnson. A second group, including papers by David Lindsey and others, Peter Tinsley and others, David Pierce, Fred Levin and Paul Meek, and Peter Keir, considers issues that are mainly tactical. A third group, consisting of four papers, considers the effects of the new procedures on the economy and on the foreign exchange market. This group consists of two papers considering international effects by Margaret Greene and by Edwin Truman and others, a paper by Lawrence Slifman and Edward McKelvey discussing the effects on economic activity, and a paper by Dana Johnson and others concerned with interest rate variability. An introduction by Stephen Axilrod summarizes principal findings and comments on both the strategic and tactical issues.
Space does not permit consideration of all of the papers or the issues they raise. We have chosen to discuss some of the strategic and tactical issues at greater length, and within these groups to select papers, or sections of papers, that raise central issues. We ignore, for example, most of the discussion of shifts in the demand function for money. The volumes add little to the existing literature, and as in most previous discussions of the "shifts," authors do not separate shifts induced by regulation of interest rates and reserve requirements from other short-term changes in the demand for money.
The four papers considering economic effects suffered from an obvious handicap. There was too little experience to evaluate and too much difficulty separating the effects of the change in monetary control procedures from other major changes during the year from random variation. There is useful information, however.
One example is the paper by Dana Johnson and others, "Interest Rate Variability Under the New Operating Procedures and the Initial Response in Financial Markets." The paper presents evidence suggesting that the variance of interest rates increased substantially in 1980 compared to earlier periods. Johnson and his colleagues find little evidence that an increase in liquidity premiums raised long-term rates relative to short-term rates. Instead, the data suggest increases in rates across the maturity structure. This finding of correlation across maturities is difficult to reconcile with a pattern of transitory shocks affecting interest rates, but it is consistent with a pattern of perceived permanent shocks.^ Why would the market perceive the change in control procedures as a sequence of permanent shocks td interest rates? The Federal Reserve study offers two, noncompetitive explanations, one by Axilrod, the other by Tinsley et al. Both explanations usé the augmented IS-LM framewotk afktiry, unsuccessfully we believe, to reconcile the data provided by Johnson with the maintained hypothesis.
Axilrod argues that the change in procedures fostered substantial confusion among market participants and, thus, increased the Variability of interest rates.^ We have difficulty reconciling this argument With the data. Uncertainty about the new procedures has a transitory effect i&at Vanishes as the credibility of the anti-inflation policy becomes apparent. Îhe effect of uncertainty about procedures should be concentrated on short-term rates, and the variability should decline once the market learns that the new procedures improve the Federal Reserve's control. Neither the level nor the variability of interest rates declined in the following years. The observed pattern is consistent with a pattern of perceived permanent shocks and increased monetary variability, not the temporary or transitory shocks required for Axilrod^s hypothesis.
An interesting study by Tinsley and others analyzes ths Response to deviations of money growth from the announced target path. A rapid return to the preannounced path increases the variability of interest rates but lowers the variability of money growth. A slow return permits greater variability of money growth, measured as deviations from the announced path or variahce of errors, but market interest rates vary less. The authors define the "reentry problem" as the choice of the speed of return to the announced path for money growth. The Federal Reserve is permitted to trade-off the variance in meisuted money growth against the variance of market interest rates.
Tinsley's analysis applies only to the variability of short-term rates. It cannot explain the increased variability of long-term rates or the association between variability of money growth, short-and long-term interest rates. Further, the proper response to a transitory change in money is to do nothing. The proper response to a permanent or persistent change, if it càii be identified, 4 Brttnner, Cukiefman, and Meltzer (1980) anafyfe perceived pertnanéiit ânj bftAùiyifecfcfo to income, price«, unemployment, and interest tales. Qddtffnan (1981) ettelKil 1he ftfttftfr of interest rates. 5 The point is developed in Axifrod*» summary.
is to remove the change rapidly enough to prevent the change from being incorporated in the public's expectations and in interest rates. Tinsley's analysis does not distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated changes in money. Hence, the study cannot distinguish between unanticipated changes in money growth that are expected to persist and, therefore, to change market interest rates permanently and changes in money growth that are expected to disappear. The neglect of anticipations is critical. The failure to introduce expectations is one example that illustrates our claim that the Federal Reserve study failed to incorporate developments in economic theory made during the past decade.
Shocks to interest rates can be either real or monetary in origin. It is difficult to find a shifting pattern of permanent or persistent changes in real variables that is broadly consistent with observed changes in interest rates. Perceptions of growing real budget deficits cannot account for the observed oscillations. Positive and negative changes in the expected real deficit did not occur with a frequency or magnitude consistent with the changes in nominal interest rates. A monetary explanation fares better.
Chart 1 suggests that there is a relatively strong correspondence between the annual rate of growth in total reserves and the level of interest rates. A similar relation holds if the annual rate of growth of the monetary base replaces total reserves. The pattern is suggestive of a strong association running from maintained rates of change in reserves (or base money) to perceived permanent changes in money and to premiums in market interest rates.
The Federal Reserve typically explains the association shown in Chart 1 as the result of shifts in the demand for money. In the IS-LM framework, an increase in the demand for money raises interest rates» Prices fall; real balances increase; and interest rates return to their previous level. This explanation can, at most, account for temporary changes in short-term interest rates. We see no way to use the explanation to account for the persistence of high real interest rates on short-and long-term debt more than two years after the change in policy procedures. Further, as we show below, the interpretation does not follow from the Federal Reserve hypothesis. Their hypothesis, as currently formulated, does not permit anyone to identify all deviations of money with shifts in the demand for money.
The change in policy procedures was introduced, in response to pressures from foreign governments, to increase control of money growth and to lower inflation. Successful implementation should have lowered the variability of money growth and strengthened the credibility of the frequent statements about determination to control inflation. The volumes give no evidence of a decline in the variability of money growth. We have computed the variance Reserve data are four-week moving averages.
of unanticipated changes in money growth for periods before and after October 1979. (See Table 1 .) The variance of money growth more than doubled, following the change in policy procedures. With the benefit of more time, we know that the increased variability cannot be explained entirely by the credit control program of 1980. In 1981 the variability of money growth remained above the levels preceding the October 1979 change in policy procedures. And shortand long-term interest rates, after adjusting for inflation, remained far above the levels that prevailed before the October 1979 announcement.
Suppose the public perceived the October 1979 change as a hesitant and possibly reluctant abandonment of an inherited strategy and the adoption of a poorly designed tactical procedure to implement a strategy of monetary control. A series of conflicting statements and the absence of a clear procedure for implementing the new strategy, when combined with increased variability of interest rates and money, increases uncertainty and leads to excessive concentration on short-term changes in money. The public searches for clttes to determine whether the new procedures are likely to produce the promised policy of disinflation. Persistent growth of money above target increases skepticism and raises interest rates; persistent growth of money consistent with the announced target reduces skepticism. This pattern continues. Whenever persistent disinflation becomes more believable, risk premiums decline, and interest rates decline at all maturities.
The increased variance of interest rates at all maturities was accompanied by a similar increase in the variance of the daily and monthly spot rate of exchange. The variance of forward rates appears to have been lower after the October change. The studies of exchange rates in the volume do not include an analysis of the time series structure of exchange rates on which to base a clear assessment. This is regrettable because the exchange market contains information about the public's perceptions of shocks. Increased variance of spot rates and reduced variance of forward rates suggest that shocks are domirtantly transitory, contrary to the hypothesis supported by the movements of interest rates and money.
The study of effects on economic activity by Slifman and McKelvey suggests that the October change caused a change in inventory behavior. This study attributes the increased variability of interest rates to the change in procedures, but it does not relate the higher variance of interest rates to the choice of strategy and tactics. A principal finding of the paper is that the increased variability of interest rates raised the cost of holding inventories and lowered target levels of inventory. The evidence offered in support of this conclusion is recognized to be relatively weak and difficult to separate from other large changes that occurred during the year.
TACTICS
The variance of money growth and interest rat^s around a chosen target path or level depends on the control procedures, or tactics, used by the Federal Reserve. If all shocks are known to be transitory, tactical problems are reduced to an issue of operating efficiency -whether greater operational efficiency in implementing a strategy is obtained by controlling the monetary base, reserves, interest rates, free reserves or another variable. When some shocks persist and others are transitory, the choice of tactics influences expectations about money growth, output, and inflation. Errors perceived as permanent (or persistent) induce changes in expected future values and, therefore, induce changes in borrowing and lending and in the demands for money and commodities.^ The choice of tactics raises or lowers the social cost of disinflation, under these conditions, by affecting the credibility of the public in Federal Reserve policy statements.
Doubts about the Federal Reserve's ability to control money growth are expressed frequently by Federal Reserve officials and others. Many of these statements assert that there is, at best, a loose connection between the money stock and the variables which the Federal Reserve can manipulate. In our studies for the Banking Committee (1964) and later, we maintained that ineffectual control of money is not inherent in the money supply process; loose control of money results from the tactical decisions of the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve's commitment to targets for free reserves (or nonborrowed reserves) or interest rates and the institutional practices^ it imposes or tolerates, we claim, increases the variability of money and reduces control.
Analysis of these issues for the Shadow Open Market Committee by James Johannes and Robert Rasche (1979) , and their forecasts, prepared for each meeting of the Committee, show that quarterly errors in forecasting the rate of change of the multiplier of the monetary base, generally, are less than 1% despite current institutional arrangements. These estimates are true forecasts, made in advance of the event. The implication of these forecasts is that, with strict control of the monetary base, money growth can be held within ± 1% of the annual target within semiannual or quarterly periods.
*>The importance of permanent and transitory shocks for the tactical problem should be clear from our discussion of the re-entry problem analyzed in the paper by Tinsley and others. See also Meltzer (1980) who shows that when the frequency of persistent shocks to aggregate demand is large relative to shocks to the growth rate of output, there is a strong case for controlling monetary aggregates. When the principal persistent shocks affect the growth of output, the case for interest rate control is strongest.
For many years, the Federal Reserve did not participate in public discussion of tactical issues. The volumes under review are a delayed break with this tradition. Several papers analyze tactical problems, and the issue involved therein is discussed in Stephen Axilrod's introduction. In this section, we summarize several of the main findings in the principal paper on operating procedures by the Board staff. Next, we discuss some of the issues raised in that paper and in related papers on procedures. The volumes do not contain analyses of the interaction of operating procedures, money stock, interest rates, and the demand for money. To complete this section, we offer our own analysis of the Federal Reserve's tactics.
Lindsey and others studied the controllability of money using four distinct frameworks -(1) a "judgmental approach" developed at the Board; (2) the Johannes-Rasche procedure used by the Shadow Open Market Committee to forecast the multiplier of the monetary base; (3) the "monthly" econometric model developed by the Board's staff; and (4) an alternative model developed at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco. There are three versions of the judgmental procedure, reflecting three types of information. The staff chose four reserve measures -nonborrowed reserves, total reserves, the nonborrowed monetary base (the base minus borrowings from the Federal Reserve); and the monetary base -as control variables and made forecasts of multipliers for three definitions of money, M-\A, M-\B, and Ml. We concentrate on M-\B and reproduce the relevant parts of Tables 4 through 8 of the paper. Tables 4 through 6 report errors in monthly forecast at annual rates. Tables 7  and 8 report quarterly errors of forecast at annual rates. The errors in forecasting the rates of change of the multipliers are the errors in forecasting the growth rate of M-\B using a particular reserve aggregate from October 1979 to October 1980.
Several findings from Table 4 suggest that the choice of tactics is not an irrelevant detail. Monthly absolute errors at annual rates range from 4.0%, using the Board's monthly model and controlling the monetary base, to 31.4%, using the San Francisco model and nonborrowed reserves. Control of the monetary base produces the lowest average absolute error for each forecasting technique separately. Control of either the nonborrowed base or the monetary base produces the lowest mean errors for all reserve measures. Mean absolute errors are largest for all forecasting techniques, using nonborrowed reserves.
The authors argue that the estimates in Table 4 are misleading because they do not correct for the endogeneity of the various reserve measures. 8 The ^The mean error reported in Table 4 for the Johannes-Rasche procedure differs little from the error computed using the "true" (made-in-advance) forecasts at the semi-annual meetings of the Shadow Open Market Committee. These data are available for examination.
Lindsey's Table 4 Monthly n.a. -not available point is that when errors in money growth are observed during the period, the path of the reserve aggregate changes. Such changes in the reserve aggregatesay nonborrowed reserves -are not considered when computing summary statistics, so the observed monthly changes (and variances) of the money stock and the associated reserve multiplier are overstated. The staff used two procedures to "correct" for the endogeneity of the reserve aggregates. The results are shown in Table 5 and 7 and Tables 6 and 8 of the paper by Lindsey and others. Table 5 compares the predictive performances of Board and the San Francisco models. This Table and Table 7 correct the observed multiplier error for changes in the path of reserves made within the period. The absolute errors using nonborrowed reserves fall substantially below the values in Table 4 , but they remain above the errors made on the assumption that the nonborrowed base is controlled. The results using the San Francisco model fall within a relatively narrow range when allowance is made for the fact that all errors are annualized. Tables 6 and 8 compare the same two models using an alternative procedure. The nonborrowed base again produces the lowest average absolute error and the lowest root mean square error, but the superiority of the nonborrowed base compared to nonborrowed reserves is less than before. With but one exception, all the mean absolute errors now fall within the range 4,0% to 8.4% at annual rates, or, as monthly averages, 1/3% to 1/2%. This is substantially better than the control actually achieved. The quarterly data, in Table  8 , reduce the mean quarterly average error (at annual rates) to the range 0.6% to 1.8%, using one of several different procedures and any of the four control variables.
Three main conclusions can be drawn from the study:
(1) The results confirm that monetary control is technically feasible. Acceptable control can be achieved within a oneto two-quarter period. The results from several procedures and all models -Johannes-Rasche, the Board, and the San Francisco -deny the repeated assertion that the unstable demand for money destroys the controllability of money growth.
(2) Memos attached to the tables and statements in the text confirm that lagged reserve requirements reduce control. "The system of lagged reserve accounting makes the monthly average required reserve ratio by type of deposit quite unstable...and quite unpredictable as well." (Board of Governors (1981), II, p. 52 of the paper by Lindsey and others.) A change to contemporary reserve accounting would improve monetary control. ve o rs o
(3) The study recognizes that the traditional operation of the discount window lowers the degree of control. A similar conclusion is reached by Keir. (See Board of Governors (1981), I, p. 8 of the paper by Peter Keir.) The period considered is relatively short, and no comparison is made with earlier periods when different methods of control were used. A longer period also would have permitted a comparison with the longer series of forecast errors available for the Johannes-Rasche model. Nevertheless, despite substantial shocks and large uncertainty during the period, the data show that considerable improvement in monetary control can be achieved. More than a year later, none of the institutional changes to improve control has been made.
A Critique of the Study
The study makes a strong claim that the results in (their) Table 4 are misleading. The claim is that under a nonborrowed reserve or interest rate control procedure, the base is an endogenous variable determined jointly with the money stock so that the reported errors for the multipliers of the base (and total reserves) are biased. As already noted, the authors claim that the results in Table 4 overstate the errors made in estimating the multiplier for unborrowed reserves. Expressed concern for the endogeneity problem leads the authors to minimize the relevance of the findings reported in Table 4 and to emphasize the findings in Table 6 , particularly.9 The authors 1 argument permits them to dismiss the Johannes-Rasche results as irrelevant.
There are three parts to the authors' argument. First is the endogeneity of the base, total reserves, and other monetary aggregates under current (and past) operating procedures. There is no dispute about endogeneity under the Federal Reserve's procedure. Endogeneity does not imply the operation of an important bias lowering the forecasting error associated with the monetary base multiplier. Secohd, the study adjusts the multipliers to correct for changes in nonborrowed reserves made in response to unanticipated deviations of monetary growth from target. This adjustment is reported in Table 5 of Lindsey's paper. We accept this adjustment as relevant and correct, but we do not accept the assertion that the Johannes-Rasche procedure is biased and should be dismissed. The Federal Reserve study does not support this claim analytically. Third, Lindsey's study makes a further adjustment when simulating the two Federal Reserve models. This adjustment, reported in Table 6 , appears to us mistaken.
The authors' procedure is not fully described in the text, but we believe we have a correct understanding.^ Consider the linear system To compute errors for the money stock (or monetary growth), the realizations (observed values) of the disturbance vector, u, are used also. These disturbances were obtained from a model estimated on the assumption that is exogenous.
With the base (>2) fi xe d at its expected value, >>2 cannot reflect the effect of the random disturbances. The authors adjust x j (the federal funds rate) to satisfy the equation. This step makes Xj depend on the random disturbances; is no longer exogenous, as assumed in the underlying model. The authors' case for dismissing the results shown in (their) Table 4 depends critically on the allegations that endogenous influences produce major distortions in variables treated as exogenous in the monetary control process. Since the authors' procedure is open to the same criticism that they level at the Johannes-Rasche procedure, they must dismiss the endogeneity introduced into x | by their procedure as a matter of little importance. They must claim that the disturbance vector, u, is independent of the choice of exogenous variables.
The sequence of "true" forecast errors using the Johannes-Rasche procedure provides relevant evidence. The continued reliability of the procedure during a period with different policy regimes supports the claim of robustness with respect to these changes in regime. ^ The same claim cannot be made for letter from Kenneth Kopecky of the Board's staff helped us to understand the procedure that was used. We accept, for current purposes, that the linear system is correct.
11 In Lindsey (1981) the claims about endogeneity are repeated, but no new evidence or analysis is given. the Federal Reserve model simulated by Lindsey. The Federal Reserve study suggests that several of the equations in the model changed or become less reliable. Comments on the borrowing, exchange rate, and interest rate equations indicate that these relations shifted in unforeseen ways after October 1979. Shifts in these equations suggest that the Lucas criticism of econometric models is applicable to the Board's model. Shifts of the models' equations invalidate the procedure used by Lindsey.
The errors reported by Lindsey and others exaggerate the control problem. Their tables report mean monthly errors and root mean square errors as annualized values. The monthly values of mean absolute errors are multiples of the mean errors. This distorts the information and suggests that monetary control faces a staggering problem. The corresponding quarterly errors are much closer to the mean monthly error than to the mean absolute monthly errors. This suggests low serial correlation of monthly errors.
The proper method of presentation depends on the underlying stochastic process. Annualization is an assertion, possibly unintended, about the persistence of errors. It suggests that the observed monthly errors are a permanent part of the process and that errors are serially correlated. Since the relation between monthly and quarterly errors shows little evidence of serial correlation, errors appear to be transitory during the sample period and tend to cancel within a few months.
Axilrod offers an alternative justification for the use of reserves as a control variable. He claims that, by controlling reserves, the Federal Reserve can offset variations in the public's holdings of currency more effectively than by controlling the base. Governor Wallich has frequently made a similar claim.
A comparison of the variance structures of the multipliers for nonborrowed reserves (or total reserves) and the monetary base establishes that a positive covariance between changes in the ratio of currency to demand (or checkable) deposits and the ratio of time to demand deposits is a necessary condition for Axilrod's statement. Negative covariances are necessary for the superiority of the base. Further, the truth of Axilrod's claim is difficult to reconcile with the differences in forecast errors for nonborrowed reserves, total reserves, and the monetary base using the Johannes-Rasche procedure.
Fed Tactics and the Demand for Money
The research volumes contain no discussion of the framework used by the Board or its staff, and there is no attempt to relate the choice of tactics to the theory of money. In earlier work, Brunner and Meltzer (1964b), we traced the development of the free reserve doctrine from the notions advanced by Riefler, Burgess, and Strong in the 1920s. The emphasis, then, was on the role of borrowing. Borrowing was taken as exogenous. Banks were said to be reluctant to borrow, so increases in borrowing raised interest rates. Later, this thesis was extended to include excess reserves, as negative borrowing, and excess reserves minus borrowing became known as free reserves. The Federal Reserve operated on free reserves to affect interest rates and economic activity.
Sometime in the sixties the free reserve doctrine was replaced by a version of the IS-LM model.^ Emphasis shifted from free reserves and borrowing to the demand for money, but the tactics shifted much less than the verbiage. The Federal Reserve continued to set targets for short-term interest rates and to focus principally on interest rates and money market conditions. Pressure from Congress and the academic community eventually forced the Federal Reserve to give more attention to the money stock, M^, and other monetary aggregates in discussions of monetary policy, but these pressures had little influence on operating procedures until October 1979. Moreover, as recently as 1981, the Board's monthly model continued to treat the federal funds rate as a policy variable controlled by the Federal Reserve. Other interest rates are seen as determined by the federal funds rate -which is to say, by the Federal Reservewith limited influence from market forces. See Anderson and Rasche (1982) .
Despite increased reliance on econometric models by the staff, the open market committee continued to use a vague and imprecise framework for tactical decisions. The committee chose to avoid the conflicts that would arise if there were a serious effort to form a common view of the monetary process. See Lombra and Moran (1980).
14 Modelling the process used by the Federal
Reserve gives an impression of greater precision and more agreement than the facts warrant. Nevertheless, we use a model of the process to capture the main ideas of the action.
Officials and staff usually explain sustained, large positive or negative deviations of money from its path as an unanticipated shift in the demand for money. Suppose money demand is a distributed lag function of the federal funds rate, ffr, with ffr t _i used to represent all relevant past values of the funds rate. Y is the projected value of aggregate income, and M is the stock of money.
Equation (1) Suppose that a persistent positive shock to aggregate demand occurs but is perceived to be transitory. With ffr f fixed, AM t exceeds AM**(t). Since the shock is perceived to be transitory, ffr t +i = ffr t , and there is a second positive deviation of M f from M*(t) and M**(t). A series of positive shocks affects anticipations, and therefore affects borrowing, the demand for money, the rate of intermediation, and the money stock. Unless one translates the accumulated deviation of M from M** into a setting for the federal funds rate, any change in the funds rate can be either too large or too small to minimize the cost of returning to the desired path. The October 1979 change can be viewed as an attempt to let interest rates change with transitory changes in borrowing and the demand for money. Nonborrowed reserves, NBR, were to be used to keep M f closer to the chosen short-or long-run path. Let BR, RR, and ER represent borrowed reserves, required reserves, and excess reserves, respectively, where 
Free reserves F = ER -BR, so

NBR = RR + F (3)
Under current policy arrangements, required reserves depend on past deposits. Using two weeks as a period to reflect the current rule,
where /xM = m(^_i> w 1m).
The ratio, n, has the same determinants as the money multiplier associated with the monetary base. We summarize the systematic components of the multiplier in X and the stochastic components in u j.
The staff study and other recent work suggest two alternative hypotheses about free reserves or borrowing. The alternatives are written as (5a) and (5b).!7
F t = g(ffr t , disc v h, u 3t ).
(5a)
Both relations assume a negative association between the funds rate and free reserves. One, (5b), is the old Riefler, Burgess, Strong "reluctance theory" of the relation between borrowing and interest rates; (5a) reverses causality and emphasizes portfolio adjustments in response to relative prices. The discount rate, disc, has a positive coefficient, and the administration of the discount window, h, supplements the discount rate as a control instrument for borrowing in equation (5a).
Equations (1), (3), (4) with either (5a) or (5b) provide two hypotheses about the structure of the monetary process and the relation of shifts in the demand for money to interest rates and the money stock. The portfolio adjustment hypothesis uses (5a); this hypothesis reduces to a system of two equations, (6a) and (1).
NBR t -g(ffr t , disc t , ft, w 3r ) = (6a) (1) M t = \{ffr t Jfr t4> Y,u 2t ).
The "reluctance theory" reduces to three equations. Equation (1) is the same, but (6a) is replaced by (5b) and (6b).
NBRf -F t = ¡i{X t _ x , u u .!) \( ). (6b)
A principal difference between the two hypotheses is that the reluctance theory makes F f depend only on u j t _ j and u 2t . \; under the alternative hypothesis, F f depends also on A linear approximation to the solution can be written in the general form expressed by (7a) and (7b). Officials and staff explain most surprises in money growth and deviations from the target path as the result of unanticipated changes in money demand. Such statements acknowledge that restrictions on interest rates continue to have a decisive influence on money growth. Inspection of (7a) and (7b) •shows, however, that there is no reliable basis for the identification of errors in money growth with shifts in the demand for money, as is commonly done.
a(L)M t = P(L)NBR t + y(L
)u t + 8(L)X f . (7a) a(L)ffr t = j3(L)NBR t + y(L)u t + 5{L)X f .(7b)
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The shock vectors u and u contain the stochastic element in F or ffr from (5a) or (5b). Even with /z and M fixed in M, surprises reflect the combined effects of u 2 and u 3 under the portfolio adjustment hypothesis (7a).
The size of u 3 depends on the Federal Reserve's ability to specify an operationally useful hypothesis about banks' use of discount facilities. The staff study suggests that this problem has been addressed but has not been solved; the borrowing equation is not very reliable and appears to have become less reliable following the October 1979 change. The equation is replaced, at times, by extrapolation of past values. The worsened performance of the borrowing equation suggests that the shift from interest rate control to control of free reserves changed the variance-covariance structure of at least some of the equations in the staff model.
The tactical procedure for controlling money has a major difficulty that has not been overcome. The procedure depends on two relations -the demand for money and the borrowing relation -that, according to the staff and the policymakers, are highly volatile and unreliable. Axilrod ("Overview", p. 32) attributes the "looseness" of monetary control to the borrowing relation; Lindsey (1981, p. 18) locates the problem in the demand-for-money function. Both errors contribute to the deviations of M from its targets, M* or M**, according to the Board members' policy models.
Equation (8) is a simpler version of (7a).
M t = a x NBR t + a 2 u 2t + a 3 u 3t + X t . (8)
In advance of period t, policymakers have to choose the best estimates of u 2 and w 3 to determine the value of NBR t that achieves M*. The "true" values of The true conditional variance of deviations from target depends on the accuracy of the perceptions given the information available at f, as shown by (9). 
E(M r M*
The conditional variance recognizes that the values of the stochastic terms in /-I are given and known. The unconditional variance includes the latter terms and, consequently, is larger. It would be interesting to compare the predictive quality of this framework to the forecasting procedure for money multipliers developed by Johannes and Rasche. Axilrod finds the accommodative element arising from the borrowing relation to be advantageous. The procedure accommodates shocks to demand by allowing M to deviate from its path. This alleged advantage has obvious drawbacks. Permanent shocks to the demand for money drive money from its path and force the Federal Reserve either to respond or changed*. There is latent skepticism and a high degree of uncertainty about which choice the Federal Reserve will make at any time. Further, accommodation is not limited to unanticipated changes in the demand for money. The Federal Reserve also accommodates past shocks in the multiplier, /z. Accommodation of borrowing raises an important question. Where does the money come from? Neither the "reluctance" view nor the portfolio view of the Federal Reserve answers the question. Once NBR is fixed, equations (7a) and (7b) determine money and the federal funds rate, given X t and the shocks. The money stock adjusts to every shock to the demand for money within the unit period. The financial system plays no role. The money stock appears mysteriously without involving any behavior or action by banks. Intermediation and the credit markets have no influence on money or interest rates. There is one key interest rate, ffr. Other rates, as in the Federal Reserve monthly model, depend mainly on ffr2®
To answer the question, the Federal Reserve must distinguish between money and credit and treat the banks 1 demand for earning assets as associated with -but not the mirror image of -the banks 1 supply of deposits. Once this is done, all shocks to money demand do not affect the stock of money, and all financial shocks are not shocks to the demand for money. See Brunner and Meltzer (1968) . The separation of money and credit (or more serious attention to intermediation) would alter the Federal Reserve's beliefs about the influence of monetary impulses and random shocks and about their ability to control money by controlling interest rates and unborrowed reserves. Further, explicit recognition of intermediation would permit identification of the distinct influences of money market and credit market disturbances on monetary control.
STRATEGY
Two issues involved in the choice of a monetary strategy receive attention. One is an analysis of the choice between interest rates and money. The other is the choice between activist and nonactivist strategies. In this section, we discuss the papers by Enzler, Enzler and Johnson, and Davis. Then we provide evidence about their claims and more generally about the achievements of activist policymaking.
Monetary or Interest Rate Strategy
In a deterministic world, invariant under the choice of strategy, there is no basis for choosing between an interest rate strategy and a monetary strategy. Enzler and Johnson subject an IS-LM model to stochastic shocks. They augment the model by introducing a Phillips curve and a policy feedback relation. The only policy rule considered is an activist policy that is not unlike Federal Reserve policy. The rule requires the Federal Reserve to adjust the short-term interest rate in response to deviations of the money stock from its target and deviations of money growth from its target.
Enzler and Johnson use the model to answer two questions:21 (1) Do "plausible values" of the parameters produce cycles when the Federal Reserve seeks to achieve monetary targets? (2) Can an alternative policy be formulated "which would eliminate or greatly attenuate the cycles" for sets of parameter values that produce cycles under monetary targeting of the type described?
The answer to both questions is an obvious yes. We do not require lengthy analysis to know that it is possible to select parameter values, label them "plausible," and show that particular feedback rules produce cycles for the selected values. It is not difficult to change the conclusion. By replacing the distributed lag of short-term real rates with the expected short-term real rate in the aggregate-demand function, one can obtain at least one complex root with modulus exceeding unity (under an interest rate control strategy). This result is obtained if the price level adjusts slowly. Further, most economists are not surprised to learn that one can find a policy rule that improves performance relative to the arbitrary policy which they choose as a bench mark. In the Enzler and Johnson paper, the alternative rule sets "final targets" for output growth and inflation.
Enzler and Johnson conclude (p. 21): "The scope of the experiments performed was broad enough to give some reason to believe that these results would be qualitatively representative of a wide range of models... . The results would almost certainly not be representative, however, of currently fashionable models in which expectations variables are specified to be identical with the model's outcomes for those variables." Many economists will resist the characterization of rational expectations as a current fashion without relevance to the issues addressed in the paper. The problem with an interest rate strategy, analyzed by Sargent and Wallace (1975) , is independent of the model used by Sargent and Wallace. The problem can be avoided by imposing arbitrary assumptions about information or by denying that people learn, but at this stage, the problem should not be neglected or dismissed. Yet, none of the papers comparing strategies recognizes this fundamental problem brought out forcefully in models using rational expectations.
Enzler, in a separate paper, uses several models to investigate three issues by simulating responses. First, Enzler studies whether a less variable path for the policy instruments would have altered the outcomes achieved in 1980. Second, he compares different speeds of return to the target path. Third, he compares the response of variables of major interest to four types of disturbances, using both monetary control and interest rate control. Each of the shocks (to consumption, wages, prices, and demand deposits) is assumed to be permanent.
The results are similar to those obtained in earlier experiments with similar models. The best strategy depends on the type of shock. Enzler (p. 31) suggests that a good policy rule "would take into account both the relative likelihood of the various kinds of shocks in the period before the nature of the shock could be determined, and the nature and magnitude of the shock once the determination could be made."
This statement begs the key question about choosing strategies. Where do we get the information on which to base inferences before the nature of the shock is known? Enzler's conclusion lends no support to the case for policy activism or for any particular strategy.
Enzler recognizes, but dismisses, the problem of structural invariance under alternative monetary rules. He questions the relevance of the "Lucas effect" on the grounds "that it is still a matter of great dispute." This statement must puzzle anyone who believes that there is a more than modest accumulation of evidence showing that people learn and adapt.
Activist or Non-Activist Strategy
Despite lapses with respect to rational expectations, the technical quality of several of the studies is high. The Davis paper is an exception. Davis addresses the issue of activist policy, a central issue for many years in pro-fessional discussion of monetary policy. It is regrettable that the staff volume fails to contribute a serious analysis of this basic problem.
Much of Davis's paper is a discussion of what he calls "practical monetarism." There are neither references to papers developing the analysis that Davis discusses nor references to Friedman, Schwartz, Fellner, Lucas, Brunner and Meltzer, the Shadow Open Market Committee, or other "practical" monetarists. There are, however, some creative interpretations of the case against policy activism.
Davis never refers to the central argument against policy activism made in Friedman (1953) and recently presented in detail by Brunner (1980) . These arguments are independent of any specific hypothesis about money -monetarist or nonmonetarist. Instead, Davis claims that monetarists make the following arguments against activism:
(1) dominance of the monetary impulse in the determination of aggregate demand; (2) stability of the demand for money, or a vertical LM curve; (3) internal stability of the economic system; and (4) long and variable lags in the response to monetary policy. The length and variability of lags has been used as part of the rationale for a nonactivist strategy.22 The other arguments have been mentioned by "monetarists" in unrelated contexts, or are attributed to "monetarists," but they have never been used as a main argument against policy activism. Some have not been used at all. For example, from our very first work on the demand for money, in the early sixties, we have denied that the demand for money is independent of market interest rates.
Some combination of Davis's arguments can be used to establish a sufficient condition for monetary control, but they cannot exclude an activist monetary policy. Nor do they offer a necessary condition for nonactivist policies.
Davis's discussion of the case for activist policymaking is, again, impressionistic and casual. He considers the "information extraction" approach used in Kareken, Muench and Wallace (1973) and later in B. Friedman (1976). These papers show that monetary targetting (or intermediate targetting) is inefficient in a specific technical sense. Their results depend on a specific assumption about information. Policymakers are assumed to know the deterministic and stochastic structure of the economy. Davis notes the difficulties in recognizing and correctly interpreting the shocks that occur, but he does not relate the interpretation problem to the general problem of choosing policies in an uncertain world subject to permanent and transitory shocks affecting suply and demand on many markets.
Davis argues that a nonactivist strategy prevents the Federal Reserve from responding to short-run problems of the financial markets. He fails to consider the possibility that "credit crunches" are a result of the sudden shifts in policy characteristic of activist policy; thus the occurrence of "credit crunches" is not an argument for activist policy. A main issue here is whether the Federal Reserve's activism increases or reduces variability. Davis provides no evidence. His discussion also fails to distinguish between the role of a lender of last resort for the financial system and daily or weekly policy operations. "Monetarists" expect the monetary authority to function as lender of last resort; at least, we do.
The problem of defining money and the role of financial innovation are, as usual, mentioned as reasons for activism or against nonactivist policy rules. The alternative of removing regulations that encourage innovation and distort the monetary aggregates is not mentioned. There are no quantitative statements about the magnitude of the problem or of the comparative magnitude of "noise" induced by past activism. There is no mention of the effect of inflation on financial innovation in a system with noninterest-bearing required reserves.
Does the Federal Reserve Raise or Lower the Variability of GNP? 23
Variability of monetary velocity and shifts in the demand for money are common reasons for policy activism. Davis and Axilrod repeat the familiar argument that, in principle, the Federal Reserve can offset changes in the demand for money or velocity. The problem is that the Federal Reserve usually does not know whether the shifts are permanent or transitory until sometime after they occur. Also, the Federal Reserve cannot locate the source of the shock quickly. The case for activism requires the Federal Reserve to reduce variability. The argument against activism rests on the claim that the Federal Reserve does not have sufficient information to reduce variability. See Friedman (1953), Brunner (1980) . Lack of information can prevent activist policy from offsetting shocks to the demand for money even if the Federal Reserve uses the best available model of velocity (or the demand for money). 24 Consider the case in which velocity follows a random walk around a constant trend. Knowledge of the systematic process provides no basis for activist policy; neither does perfect knowledge of the stochastic process. It is obvious that, in this case, activist policies to offset changes in the demand for money or velocity may introduce 
M is defined as the sum of currency and checkable deposits, and Kj is the ratio GNP/M. To estimate the systematic and random components, we used ARIMA models for in M and in Fj. The systematic component is the optimal forecast of a univariate stochastic process, and the random component is the current innovation. Our procedure separates the systematic and random components and permits us to study, separately, the Federal Reserve's performance with respect to the systematic components and with respect to the innovations. The models were estimated using nonseasonally adjusted data from the cycle peak in third quarter 1953 to the cycle peak in first quarter 1980 and for two subperiods. To control for seasonal variation, we estimated the ARIMA seasonal factor using first differences of corresponding quarters of adjacent years, M t ~Mt-4> M t+1 " M t-3' etcThen > an -AR/M4 model separated the seasonally adjusted data into systematic and random components. Most of the processes were relatively simple moving averages or autoregressive processes of first or second order. The systematic components are the expected values, AM* and AV*. We computed the variances and the covariances of the systematic components and of the innovations.
The first two columns of Table 1 compare the variance of A Sin GNP, computed following equation (10), to the variance of A Sin GNP under a rule requiring constant monetary growth. The latter is measured provisionally, as the variance of A Sin Vj. The difference between the two columns is a measure of the variance of A Sin GNP resulting from policy activism. Our procedure partitions the difference into a systematic and random component.
For the systematic component, denoted S in Table 1 , the difference between activist policy and constant money growth is
This sum can be positive or negative. Constant money growth removes this contribution to the total systematic variance of GNP growth. The remaining systematic variance is measured (provisionally) by the variance a 2 Mn V*.
The first line in Table 1 shows that, for the period 1953-80, the systematic component of the variance, 0.90, exceeds a 2 Mn V* The difference between the two, 0.20, is the (positive) contribution of activist policy to the variance of GNP growth. The second line of Table 1 , denoted /, compares the random components. If
activist policy has reduced random fluctuations. Line 2 shows that a v is the larger of the two, so it is clear that the covariance of the random components is negative and larger than in absolute value a 2 .
Line 3 is the variance of GNP growth, the sum of the systematic and random components. Column (1) shows the measured variance of GNP growth; column (2) The difference between the contributions to a 2 Mn GNP from the innovations suggests that the covariance, o(n, v), is small but negative. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the innovations are statistically independent. No particular significance should be read into the positive or negative differences for I. The same appears to be true for the combined results, obtained by summing the S and / results for the period as a whole and for the first subsample. The results for 1969-80 suggest, however, that activist monetary policy increased the variance of Mn GNP.
The findings reported in the first two columns of Table 1 
The result for the systematic component during the full period, 1953-80, favors constant rate of base growth. The main conclusion to be drawn from columns (3) and (4) is that there is again no evidence to support the claim that activist policies reduce the variability of nominal GNP. There is no evidence in the comparisons that activist monetary policy has contributed to economic stability.
Constant growth of the base can be set to achieve the growth of money that is consistent with the GNP growth path. As an alternative, base growth can be set on a path related to GNP growth directly. Column (5) A striking result of the comparison of activist and nonactivist policies is our finding that, in every two-way comparison of systematic components, constant money' growth lowers the variance of A in GNP. Results for the innovations are generally closer together, as expected from the nature of these random components. Taken together these results do not provide a strong case for activist policies.
Further consideration suggests two reasons why the case for activist policies is likely to be weaker than Table 1 suggests. First, the ARIMA models overstate the amount of information about the various processes available when decisions are made. The models separate random and systematic components, including seasonal factors, with greater accuracy than is usually available. One reason is that the models have a larger sample on which to base information 25 With a currency drain, a run on the banks, or in other financial crises, we believe the monetary authority should function as lender of last resort. We would expect the authority to abandon constant base growth during such crises.
about the changing nature of shocks, seasonal adjustments, and structure because they include information beyond the period in which the shocks occur. Second, some of the variance of velocity reported in Table 1 arises because variable monetary growth induces changes in market interest rate and expected inflation. Variation in these variables induces changes in the demand for money and in velocity. As previously noted, the variance of A Sin Fj would change if the Federal Reserve adopted a policy of constant money growth.
To investigate the effect of variable money growth on the variability of velocity, we separate A Sin V* (or A Sin Vq) into three terms. As is well-known from any standard macroeconomic theory, velocity depends on real and monetary factors. The variance of the systematic component, a 2 (A£fl V*), is, therefore, the sum of (1) the contribution of real shocks, (2) the contribution of A Sin M*, and (3) the contribution of the covariance of monetary and real shocks. Constant money growth sets the second term to zero and makes real and monetary shocks independent,, so the third term is also zero. The total variance a 2 (A£w K*), and the systematic component of a 2 (A£w GNP), is equal to the contribution of real factors. An activist policy can lower a 2 A Sin V* relative to a rule requiring constant money growth if, and only if, the third term is sufficiently negative.
26
We have not presented information that permits an unambiguous conclusion to be drawn. However, some of the data reported in Table 1 are suggestive. We know from Table 1 
The Shifting Demand for Money
Advocates of "flexibility" and discretionary activism often argue that the demand for money is "unstable" or "shifting." Evidence to support this position usually depends on residuals from estimated demand equations for money. Most of the estimates are for single equations; thus they do not separate the effects of regulation on the stock of a particular monetary aggregate from changes in demand. Changes induced by regulation of interest rates and inflation are often treated as random shocks to the demand for money.
This section presents results of a study of the time series structure of two measures of velocity, VQ and VJ, during the three most recent decades. Equations were estimated as first differences of seasonally adjusted quarterly data of the logarithms of velocity. A first-order moving average of A in V was used for all estimates.
27 All shocks to the demand for money are shocks to velocity, but the converse is not true. Table 2 shows the computed trends in velocity for the past thirty years and for each decade separately. For VQ the trend is approximately 0.6% per quarter, and for V\, 0.76% during the thirty-year period. There is no significant difference between the trend rates of changes of VQ estimated for the fifties and the seventies, and there is no evidence of a higher trend in recent years.
If velocity is (approximately) a random walk, innovations in the growth of velocity are permanent shifts in level. There is no way to predict these shifts, and unless all changes are known to be either permanent or transitory, no one can expect to offset changes in V without increasing the variance of A in GNP. The VQ process shows evidence of becoming a random walk in the sixties and remaining a random walk in the seventies. The coefficient, 0, describing the first-order process for is not significantly different from zero in the sixties, but the random walk in Kj did not continue through the seventies according to these estimates.
The standard deviations of innovations in in VQ and in Kj computed for the seventies are lower than the corresponding estimates for the fifties. This finding is a clear contradiction to the many statements about shifts in velocity or the demand for money by Federal Reserve spokesmen and others. In fact, a puzzling feature of these data is the absence of a large change in trend or
27
Estimates for using M^t were computed. These show similar patterns. Serial correlations tor VQ and V\ estimates were generally not significant after lag 1. variability under conditions of relatively high and variable inflation. We conclude that these data show no significant evidence of a change in the trend growth of velocity.
CONCLUSION: PRO-CYCLICAL MONEY GROWTH
The two volumes analyzing Federal Reserve operations are comparable to a conference volume. They contain several papers that are informative, some that will continue to be discussed, and some that do not succeed. Our long experience with conference volumes suggests to us that this is not an unusual mix. More impressive is the fact that most of the papers were written within a short period by the staff of a single agency.
A main purpose of the studies was to evaluate the first year of experience with the October 1979 change in operating procedure. One year is a short period; not much can be learned about the effects on GNP, prices or other broad aggregates, and not much is said about the quality of the new procedures relative to other (for example) past procedures. Adding to the problem of evaluating the change in procedure after so short a period is the experience itself. Money growth was more variable than usual. The annualized percentage growth rates of money (MIB) in the four quarters beginning with fourth quarter of 1979 are, respectively, 4.7, 7.0, -3.0, and 14.6. The stock of money declined during the recession and rose during the expansion, influenced no doubt by the credit control program in the spring of the year and its elimination in the summer. Nominal GNP growth for the same four quarters is 8.8, 12.6, -1.1, and 11.8.
Money growth shows the familiar pro-cyclical pattern -the same pattern we and others have discussed many times. The imposition and elimination of credit controls probably explains part of the pro-cyclicality of money and GNP f but the studies do not claim that the problems are specific to the year. And they are not. There is no evidence that pro-cyclicality has been eliminated.
Continued pro-cyclicality is not easy to reconcile with the greater importance allegedly given to control of monetary aggregates. Neither is the fact that the Federal Reserve was no more successful in reaching its targets for MAB in 1980 and 1981 than in prior years. In both years, the Federal Reserve missed the announced M\B target by more than two percentage points.
Several of the studies suggest that institutional changes would reduce errors and improve control of money. Elimination of seasonal adjustment, a return to contemporaneous reserve accounting, simplification of the reserve requirement structure, and improvements in borrowing arrangements are mentioned. There is a strong case for these changes as steps to improve monetary control. But the proposed changes, desirable as they are, are unlikely to eliminate pro-cyclicality or have much influence on the Federal Reserve's ability to hit their announced annual targets. In the language of our paper, the proposed changes are tactical improvements, not a strategic change in procedures.
A review of the tactical procedures shows that the federal funds rate continues to have an important role. Until October 1979, the Federal Reserve set targets for the funds rate and allowed reserves and money to adjust to demand. In October 1979, the Federal Reserve reversed the process. Targets for nonborrowed reserves are chosen to achieve targets for total reserves and money. The estimation of borrowed reserves and money depends on the funds rate, so the errors made in predicting interest rates, borrowing, and the demand for money continue to move money and reserves far from their target paths at times.
The volumes do not include an analytic restatement of the roles of interest rates and reserves in the monetary control process. Our formalization of the links shows that errors in forecasting the demand for money and errors in the borrowing equation introduce random elements into the equations determining reserves and money. Statements about the cause of deviations by staff and policymakers, and parts of the work done by current and former staff members, are consistent with our analyses. These statements and papers attribute most deviations from monetary targets to shifts in the demand for money or shifts in bank borrowing from the Federal Reserve.
If all the errors in the borrowing and the demand-for-money equations are transitory random shocks, the use of interest rate targets puts random fluctuations into the stock of money but has no lasting effect on money. An improbably long series of transitory shocks is required to induce the observed pattern of persistent, pro-cyclical changes in the demand for money. See Friedman (1959) . To be consistent with observed changes in money and velocity, the sequence of serially correlated, transitory shocks must repeat with a frequency equal to the frequency of a standard business cycle.
Our studies of velocity suggest that quarterly changes in velocity are well-described by a moving average of random shocks. Velocity has a stochastic trend, given by the permanent component, and a transitory random component. The best forecast of velocity, conditional on all available information, is that velocity follows an augmented random walk. Additional evidence, for a longer period, is Gould et al (1978) .
Permanent or persistent changes in velocity cannot be identified at the time they occur. Neither the Federal Reserve nor anyone else can forecast the interest rate that holds money growth on a stable path unless they can separate persistent and transitory shocks. An activist policy in a world of unidentifiable permanent and transitory disturbances commits us to a risky strategy. It is likely to introduce more variance than it removes.
Computations of the systematic and total variance of GNP suggest that activist monetary policy does introduce more variance than it removes. The difference between a policy of constant monetary growth and an activist policy is, typically, not large, but further analysis suggests that the computed differences are underestimated. The main reason is that a policy of constant monetary growth, pursued on a sustained basis, removes one cause of changes in velocity -shifts in the demand for money in response to perceived shifts in the growth rate of money.
The analysis of velocity helps to explain why Federal Reserve policy is a main cause of pro-cyclical money growth. The Federal Reserve sets targets or bands for interest rates. Unless the Federal Reserve correctly identifies permanent and transitory changes when they occur, the market interest rate they choose will, at times, be above or below the equilibrium rate consistent with full employment.
Suppose the public finances a persistent increase in aggregate spending by supplying assets to banks and by reducing cash balances. The Federal Reserve prevents the induced rise in interest rates by increasing bank reserves. The stock of money rises, lowering the increase in measured velocity and increasing average cash balances. The initial increase in aggregate spending is followed by additional increases, some induced by the desired increase in spending, some by the unanticipated increase in M. The Federal Reserve eventually offsets the bulge in money. Interest rates rise, but the Federal Reserve cannot know where to set the interest rate because it cannot identify the persistent and transitory components of the change in aggregate demand. A similar analysis applies to movements of money, spending, and interest rates during recessions.
Our analysis does not imply that there is a single, unchanging constant rate of money growth. Persistent changes in the growth of productivity may change the growth of output and, therefore, change the rate of money growth consistent with a maintained average rate of inflation. Sustained changes in the rate of growth of output cannot be separated promptly from the many sustained and transitory changes to the level of output, so they do not provide a rationale for activist policy.
The two volumes do not offer a clear, coherent statement of the case for activist policy, for interest rate targets, or for the strategy currently used to conduct monetary policy. We know of no such evidence elsewhere that supports continued use of activist policies. Perhaps we have overlooked relevant evidence. We look forward to seeing the empirical basis of the case for activist policy set forth with as much care as is spent on the tactical issues in the volumes we have discussed here.
